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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(g) (1987) the Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Matter.

This appeal is

from a six (6) day bench trial.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Carleen (Neilson) Collram presents the following issues
in this appeal:
1.

Did the Trial Court err when lit concluded as a mat-

ter of law that the Prenuptial Agreement was void as violative of
the public policy of this State?
2.

Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-

ter of law that the consideration for the Prenuptial Agreement
was a "normal marital relationship;" that the consideration
failed; and therefore, that the Prenuptial Agreement was void?
3.

Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-

ter of law that the Court had the equitable power to distribute
property contrary to the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement?
4.

Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a mat-

ter of law that the Domestic Relations Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation was a binding Order of the Cburt?
5.

Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the defen-

dant to pay her own attorney's fees out of the assets awarded to
her upon divorce and determine the amount that she should pay?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE|
Plaintiff Alfred Neilson brought this action against
defendant Carleen (Neilson) Collram to annul their marriage and
-1-

to avoid a prenuptial agreement (hereinafter referred to as the
"Prenuptial Agreement" or "Agreement") they entered into prior to
marriage.

A copy is attached as Addendum "A."

Plaintiff alleged

that defendant fraudulently induced him to marry her; and, that
she fraudulently induced him to execute the Prenuptial Agreement.
(R. 2-18)

A six (6) day bench trial was held.

During the trial,

the Trial Court heard extensive evidence from both parties.
After trial, the Trial Court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

(R. 385-388, 389-398)

The Trial Court specifically found that plaintiff was
not fraudulently induced to enter into the marriage; and, that he
was not fraudulently induced to enter into the Prenuptial Agreement.

(R. 394)

It also found that the parties did not enter

into the Prenuptial Agreement under fraud, duress or with undue
influence upon either of them.

(R. 394)

The Trial Court found

that plaintiff's attorney prepared the Prenuptial Agreement in
accord with plaintiff's wishes; and, that he acted as attorney
for both parties in the drafting and execution of the Agreement.
(R. 394)
The Trial Court found that the "Prenuptial Agreement is
void and against this State's public policy for the reason that
it encourages conduct designed to facilitate the break up of a
marital relationship."

(R. 396)

The Court further found that

"the consideration for the [Prenuptial Agreement] itself, to wit,
a normal marital relationship, failed."

-2-

(R. 394)

Consequently,

the Trial Court held the Prenuptial Agreement void as violative
of public policy.

(R. 396-7)

The Trial Court made factual findings as to the marital
assets; and, the income and assets of the parties.

It also made

the findings necessary to enter a Decree of Divorce.
(R. 389-398)
The Trial Court also concluded as a matter of law that
it had the "equitable power to divide all property, including the
property encompassed within the Prenuptial Agreement, on the
grounds of equity and justice."

It concluded that it had these

powers even if the Prenuptial Agreement was not declared void as
violative of public policy.

However, the Ttial Court expressed

that it did not exercise these powers as a basis for its decision.

(R. 396-7)
The Trial Court denied plaintifff$ petition for annul-

ment.

(R. 396)

Instead, it awarded plaintiff a divorce based

upon irreconcilable differences and mental truelty.

(R. 396)

The Trial Court then awarded and divided the property accumulated
during the marriage.

(R. 397-8)

The Trial Court ordered defen-

dant to pay her own attorneys $20,000.00 in attorneys' fees out
of the property it awarded to her.

(R. 397)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 6, 1986, plaintiff contacted his attor-

ney, David E. Salisbury, and had him draft the Prenuptial Agreement.

As justification for his request, plaintiff expressed that

he wanted to protect his assets.
-3-

Plaintiff told Mr. Salisbury

the specific provisions he wanted included for the distribution
of his stock.
ment.

Plaintiff's attorney drafted the Prenuptial Agree-

Defendant reviewed the Agreement, asked Mr. Salisbury

questions concerning it, and asked two of her friends, who are
both attorneys, their opinion of the Prenuptial Agreement.
(Trial Trans. 382-387)

Thereafter, defendant went to Mr.

Salisbury's office and suggested some changes to the Agreement.
(Trial Trans. 212-220)

Mr. Salisbury acted as the attorney for

both plaintiff and defendant.
2.

(R. 391)

On February 25, 1986, plaintiff and defendant met

in Mr. Salisbury's office, discussed the provisions, suggested
changes and agreed upon the provisions of the Prenuptial Agreement.

(Trial Trans. 212-220)

At that time, both parties signed

the Agreement in the presence of Mr. Salisbury.
3.

At the time the Prenuptial Agreement was signed,

plaintiff was 65 years old.
school.

(R. 391)

He graduated from college and law

He has been a businessman all of his life.

Trans. 114-5)

Defendant was 31 years old.

(Trial

She graduated from

the University of Utah with a degree in financing and she had
pursued a career in banking.

(R. 393)

4.

On July 17, 1986, plaintiff filed his complaint.

5.

On August 17, 1986, defendant petitioned for tempo-

(R. 2)

rary support.
6.

(R. 25-28)
On September 2, 1986, the Commissioner of Domestic

Relations recommended denial of the motion for temporary support;
-4-

and, recommended that defendant not sell any of the stock
acquired pursuant to the Prenuptial Agreement.
7.

(R. 75, 88)

On September 5, 1986, defendant timely objected to

the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.

(R. 78-79)

Prior

to the Trial Court's hearing and disposition of the motion for
temporary support, defendant sold 372 shares of the 1,272 shares
of stock that she had received at trial.

She testified that she

had had no support from plaintiff since July 19, 1986 and that
the sale of stock was necessary for her temporary support.
(R. 217; Trial Trans. 446-48)
8.

On January 9, 1987, plaintiff petitioned the Trial

Court to hold defendant in contempt for her action.
9.

(R. 198)

On January 23, 1987, the Court heard plaintiff's

motion and defendant's objections.

It held defendant in contempt

as violative of the Commissioner's "order;" and, upheld the
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation over defendant's objections.

(R. 217)
10.

Beginning June 29, 1987 and ending July 30, 1987,

the Trial Court heard six (6) days of testimony.

(R. 334-6,

339-42)
11.

On July 30, 1987, the Trial Court gave its ruling

from the bench.

It instructed plaintiff's counsel to prepare

Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.
(R. 342)

-5-

12.

The Trial Court found that defendant did not

fraudulently induce plaintiff to marry her and it denied
plaintifffs claim for annulment.
13.

(R. 394, 396)

The Trial Court used its claimed equitable powers

to treat plaintiff's Complaint as a complaint for divorce and
awarded to plaintiff a decree on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences and mental cruelty.
14.

(R. 396)

The Trial Court also found that defendant did not

fraudulently induce plaintiff to enter into the Prenuptial Agreement. (R. 394)
15.

The Trial Court found and concluded the Prenuptial

Agreement violated the State's public policy; and therefore, it
held the Agreement was void.

It violated public policy according

to the Trial Court because it facilitated divorce.

The Trial

Court failed to specify any provision that facilitated divorce.
It also failed to articulate what public policy was harmed by the
Agreement.

(R. 396)

16.

The Trial Court also found that the consideration

for the Prenuptial Agreement failed.

The Trial Court based its

decision on the ground that the consideration for the Agreement
was a "normal marital relationship;" and, that no such relationship existed.
17.

(R. 394)
The Trial Court concluded as a matter of law that

it had the equitable powers to rewrite the Agreement and make it
"fair."

Although, the Court did not exercise this power as a

basis for its final decision.

(R. 396)

-6-

18.

On October 29, 1987, the Trial Court heard

defendant's objections to plaintiff's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce.
19.
judgment.

(R. 344)

On December 19, 1987, the Trial Court entered

(R. 385-388)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Almost all United States jurisdictions recognize the

validity of prenuptial agreements that divide property upon
divorce.

Those jurisdictions recognize that those types of

prenuptial agreements do not violate public policy.
In this case, the Trial Court erred when it concluded
that the Prenuptial Agreement between the parties violated public
policy.

While the Prenuptial Agreement may have facilitated

property division in the event of a divorce, it did not encourage
or promote divorce.

Therefore, the Prenuptial Agreement passed

the test of public policy.
The Trial Court erred when it concluded that the consideration for the Prenuptial Agreement failed.

The Trial Court

incorrectly interpreted the Prenuptial Agreement's consideration
as requiring a "normal marital relationship."

Instead, the

Agreement called for the parties to marry and consummate that
marriage as the consideration for the Agreement.
This Court should prohibit a trial court from making an
inquiry into the "fairness" of a prenuptial agreement.

Instead,

a Utah trial court should follow the rule that it will view a
prenuptial agreement as objectively as any other contract.
-7-

The Trial Court erred in holding that the Domestic
Relations Commissioner's recommendation was a binding Order,
before the Trial Court formally ruled on defendant's objections
to the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation,

Both due pro-

cess considerations and statutory construction require that a
trial court make its own determination as to the Commissioner's
recommendation before it becomes a binding Order.
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it ordered
defendant to pay her own attorneys' fees out of the property
awarded to her upon divorce.

The Trial Court abused its discre-

tion because it ordered her to pay those fees out of her own
funds.

It also erred when it set the specific sum she was to pay

her own attorneys.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF
THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT.
A.

Standard of Review
Plaintiff brought this action in both equity and law.

The equitable action sought to annul his marriage.

See Burnett

v. Burnett, 192 Kan. 247, 387 P.2d 195 (1963) (an action for
annulment is an equitable proceeding).

The equitable and legal

action sought to void the Prenuptial Agreement and to require
defendant to return shares of stock to plaintiff.
In this appeal, defendant attacks the Trial Court's
Conclusions of Law as to the Agreement, not its specific Findings
of Fact.

Since defendant appeals the Trial Court's legal
-8-

conclusions regarding the Agreement, this Court should review the
case at law.
novo.

And consequently, it should review the case de

See So. Oregon Production Ass'n v. Patridqe, 71 Or. App.

53 P.2d 135 (1984) (reviewing case that began in equity as a case
at law because only legal issues were presented).
When this Court reviews the Trial Court's Conclusions
of Law, it should not defer to the Trial Court's decision.
Instead, it must review the correctness of the Trial Court's
decision.

See Russell v. Erickson Landscaping, 711 P.2d 250

(Utah 1985) (the trial court's legal conclusions are subject to
review for their correctness); Scharf v. BMG Construction, 700
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) (stating the standard).

And furthermore,

it must review the Prenuptial Agreement's language as a question
of law, not fact.

Therefore, this Court is free to render its

own, independent, interpretation of the Agreement's terms.

See

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) (stating the
standard).
However, this Court must defer to the Trial Court's
factual findings.

This deference applies to actions in equity,

see Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d
918 (Utah 1982) (in appeals from equity, the court defers to the
Trial Court's factual findings and reverses those findings only
when the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's
findings); and, to actions at law, see Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070
(stating these principles apply to actions at law); Russell, 711

-9-

P.2d at 252 (noting that an appeals court should defer to the
finder of fact).
B.

Overview of the Validity Of Prenuptial Agreements,
Virtually every United States jurisdiction recognizes

the validity of prenuptial agreements.

Generally, prenuptial

agreements do not violate public policy per se.

See Brooks v.

Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1986) (the nationwide trend recognizes the validity of prenuptial agreements); Gant v, Gant, 329
S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985) (endorsing the growing acceptance of
prenuptial agreements and their validity).
2
In a complete turnabout from the common law,

many

states now favor prenuptial agreements as a matter of public policy.

See, e,q,, Spector v, Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d

176 (1972) (Arizona's public policy favors prenuptial agreements); Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W,2d 567 (Minn, 1980) (Minnesota
law favors prenuptial agreements).

The modern trend that favors

prenuptial agreements is expressed by the Uniform Prenuptial
Agreement Act ("UPAA").

Under the UPAA, written prenuptial

agreements are presumed valid if signed by both parties.
1

The attached addendum cites cases from across the United
States that recognize the validity of prenuptial agreements.
See Addendum "B."

2

Prior to 1970, prenuptial agreements that governed property
distribution upon divorce were considered invalid by many
jurisdictions as contrary to public policy. See Brooks, 733
P.2d at 1048-49 (explaining the common law rule); Gant, 289
S.E.2d at 112 (noting public policy of thirty (30) years ago
prohibited prenuptial agreements that disposed of property
upon divorce).
-10-

This Court has addressed the issue of the validity of
prenuptial agreements.

This Court has noted, in dictum, that

prenuptial agreements are generally valid.

See Huck v. Huck, 734

P.2d 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1986) (noting that prenuptial agreements
are generally valid if not based on fraud, coercion or
non-disclosure).

This Court reaffirmed the Huck dictum in Berman

v. Berman, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Feb. 1, 1988).
Accordingly, this Court should adopt the nationwide
rule that prenuptial agreements are valid and do not violate public policy per se.
II.

THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY.
A.

Introduction

The Trial Court concluded the Prenuptial Agreement was
void as violative of this State's public policy. 3 According to
the Trial Court, the Prenuptial Agreement contained language that
"facilitated11 divorce.

(R. 396)

As defendant will demonstrate,

the Trial Court erred.
B.

Applicable Legal Standard
While no Utah case directly addresses this issue, sev-

eral jurisdictions deal with it squarely, most notably, California.

3

Prenuptial agreements offend public policy only insofar as

The Trial Court did not invalidate the Prenuptial Agreement
on any specific grounds other than public policy. The Trial
Court specifically found and held that the Prenuptial Agreement was not fraudulently induced. The Trial Court also
found that neither party entered into the Agreement as a
result of coercion or duress. (R. 394)
-11-

the agreement's language "encourages" or "promotes" divorce.
However, a prenuptial agreement that simply "facilitates" divorce
does not violate public policy:
In a literal sense, any contract which delimits the property rights of the spouses might
"facilitate" dissolution by making possible a
shorter and less expensive dissolution hearing. But public property does not render
property agreements unenforceable merely
because such agreement simplifies the division of marital property; it is only when the
agreement encourages or promotes dissolution
that it offends the public policy to foster
and protect marriage.
Marriage of Dawley, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 17 Cal. 3rd. 342, 551 P.2d
323 (Cal. 1976).
While courts fail to articulate guidelines as to what
type of language "promotes" or "encourages" dissolution, language
that contemplates divorce passes public policy muster.
riage of Dawley, 551 P.2d at 325.

See Mar-

Simply put, public policy is

not offended when parties enter into a prenuptial agreement with
the thought that the marriage may end in divorce.

See Marriage

of Dawley, 351 P.2d at 328-329.
C.

The Trial Court Erred
The standard of review calls for this Court to freely

and independently review the Prenuptial Agreement's language, and
to determine: whether, as a matter of law, the Prenuptial Agreement promotes divorce; and, whether, as a matter of law, the
Prenuptial Agreement violates public policy.

However, this Court

should defer to the Trial Court's factual findings as to the

-12-

Agreement.

The Trial Court found that there was no fraud, coer-

cion and duress in entering into the Agreement.

(R. 394)

In this case, the Trial Court concluded that the
Prenuptial Agreement facilitated divorce.

The Trial Court

explicitly noted and carefully concluded that the Agreement did
not encourage or promote divorce.

The Trial Court ruled specifi-

cally on the language of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

It had the choice between words "encouraged" and
4
..

"facilitates."

The Trial Court carefully chose "facilitates;"

and, one can assume that it deliberately held the Agreement
facilitated, but did not encourage divorce.

The Trial Court also

failed to point to any specific language of the Prenuptial Agreement that facilitated divorce.
This Court should defer to the Trial Court's factual
findings that the Agreement only facilitated divorce and determine whether the Trial Court correctly applied the facts to the
law.

Under the California standard, it did not.

The Trial Court

erred by holding that a prenuptial agreement that facilitates
divorce violates public policy.

As a matter of law, a prenuptial

agreement that facilitates, but does not encourage, divorce

4

The Trial Court faced Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. During
the hearing, the Trial Court rejected the word "encouraged."
While this hearing was reported, the court reporter, Ernie
Sanchez, has moved from Utah and took the transcript with
him; and therefore, it is not available.
-13-

passes the tests of public policy.

Consequently, the Trial

Court's incorrect legal conclusion requires reversal.
If this Court decides not to defer to the Trial Court's
factual findings, it must independently determine whether the
Agreement's language encourages divorce.

The Prenuptial

Agreement's language does not encourage or promote divorce.

The

Prenuptial Agreement actually encourages and promotes marital
success between the parties.
5
make the marriage succeed.

It requires that each party work to
..
The only provisions of the

Prenuptial Agreement that contemplate divorce are paragraphs 8
and 9.

The other provisions of the Prenuptial Agreement do not

mention divorce.
Paragraph 8 explains the impact of divorce on the parties' wills executed under the Agreement.

In effect, paragraph 8

simply allows the party that does not initiate divorce to change
his or her will.

The party that initiates divorce must keep his

or her will in accord with the Agreement.
ment 11 8.

See Prenuptial Agree-

Therefore, on its face, paragraph 8 does not violate

public policy because it confers no benefit on the party that
initiates divorce.
Paragraph 9 sets out a property distribution schedule
during marriage; and, distributes additional property in the
event of divorce.

5

Paragraph 9's language creates an economic

Defendant testified that she wanted the parties to work at
making the marriage successful. (Trial Trans. 468-70)
-14-

disincentive for plaintiff to initiate a divorce action.
Prenuptial Agreement f 9.

See

In that event, plaintiff would forfeit

one-half (1/2) of his stock.

That prospect, viewed in light of

common sense and fiscal prudence, prevents anyone from reasonably
contending that the Prenuptial Agreement encourages or encouraged
plaintiff to seek a divorce.

On the contrary, an objective exam-

ination of the provision's language leads one to conclude that it
encourages plaintiff to stay married, to work at making the marriage a success and to avoid divorce.
The same argument applies equally to defendant.

Defen-

dant gains no advantage under the Agreement's terms that can be
said to promote divorce.

Indeed, the Agreement promotes marriage

because defendant receives more in the way of property the longer
she stays married.

On the other hand, defendant receives no more

for each year of marriage than she would probably receive by a
Utah court's equitable distribution, in absence of the Agreement.
The entire thrust of the Prenuptial Agreement encourages and promotes marriage by requiring the parties to work for a
successful marriage.

The Prenuptial Agreement facilitates

divorce in the sense that it makes property division easier and
definite upon divorce; and thereby, decreases litigation.

How-

ever, it has a harsher effect on the party who initiates divorce.
It is difficult to image that a trial court would be harsher on
plaintiff if he initiated divorce or on defendant if she did the
same, then the parties are treated under the Agreement's terms.
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And, in this case, the Trial Court treated plaintiff more favorably than the Agreement mandated,
A prenuptial agreement that distributes property in a
seemingly uneven manner does not encourage divorce or violate
public policy.

On the contrary, the generally accepted view

enforces prenuptial agreements, which are otherwise valid,
regardless of the distribution of assets in the event of divorce.
See Matter of Estate of Moss, 200 Nev. 215, 263 N.W.2d 98 (1978)
(holding that an apparently disproportionate provision for a wife
or a disparity between what she is to receive and the value of
the husband's property does not, in and of itself, afford a basis
for voiding a prenuptial agreement); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d
728 (Colo. 1982) (holding that a prenuptial agreement is enforceable even if it disproportionately divides the property); Matter
of Marriage of Bacchus, 78 Or. App. 663, 717 P.2d 654, reh'q
denied, 722 P.2d 737, 301 Or. 338 (1986) (holding that a
prenuptial agreement was valid when the wife was aware of the
nature of the husband's estate at the time she signed the
prenuptial agreement; understood the consequences of the agreement; and, understood the distribution of assets upon divorce).
Even if Paragraph 9 treats plaintiff harshly upon initiating
divorce, that alone does not invalidate the Agreement on the
grounds of public policy.

The Trial Court should not substitute

its own opinions for the contractual provisions of the parties.
The Prenuptial Agreement promotes marriage, not
divorce.

The agreed upon property divisions in the event of
-16-

divorce do not violate public policy.

The Agreement passes pub-

lic policy muster and should be upheld as valid.

Accordingly,

the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's conclusion
that the Prenuptial Agreement violates this State's public
policy.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT FAILED.
A.

Introduction
The Trial Court's interpretation of the Prenuptial

Agreement's language led it to conclude that the Agreement's consideration failed.
B.

(R. 394)

The Trial Court erred.

Applicable Legal Standard
Consideration fails "whenever one who has either given

or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that
performance."

See Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984)

(stating the rule).

This rule applies to prenuptial agreements

as well as any other contract.

See Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d at

112 (general contract law governs prenuptial agreements).
C.

The Trial Court Erred
The Trial Court's error as to failed consideration was

not factually based.

Instead, the Trial Court misinterpreted the

Agreement's language, thus this Court need not defer to the Trial
Court, and it may independently review the Agreement's language.
The Prenuptial Agreement contains two forms of consideration.

The first form of consideration is mutual promises to
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marry.

See Prenuptial Agreement, p. 1.

The second form of con-

sideration is other good and valuable consideration.

Id.

This

second form includes mutual waivers of rights because both parties, through signing the Agreement, waived their property rights
under this State's divorce statutes.

Indeed, the Prenuptial

Agreement's purpose is to avoid court enforced property division
under the equitable distribution rules.
adequate and valuable consideration.

Both forms constitute

See Williams v. Williams,

569 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978) (mutual promises to marriage,
subsequently performed, provide valuable consideration for a
prenuptial agreement); Friendlander v. Friendlander, 80 Wash. 2d
293, 494 P.2d 208 (Wash. 1972) (marriage is not only valuable
consideration, but it is consideration of the highest value);
Herman v. Gotz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969) (mutual waivers
of rights constitute adequate consideration for a prenuptial
agreement).
The first form of consideration, mutual promises of
marriage, did not fail.

The Trial Court erred when it inter-

preted the Agreement's language as calling for a "normal marital
relationship."

No such term exists in the Agreement.

The Trial

Court's reliance on its own determination that the Agreement's
consideration was a "normal marital relationship" has no foundation at law.

Legally, the Trial Court should have determined

whether the marriage was legally contracted and consummated,
because that was the consideration for the Agreement.

What the

Trial Court may consider as a "normal marital relationship" is
-18-

irrelevant.

It was never part of the consideration contracted by

the parties.

See Berman v. Berman, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. at 54

(prenuptial agreements are construed and treated the same as contracts in general).

See also Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 115

(judges should not rewrite prenuptial agreements to conform to
their liking).
The Prenuptial Agreement does not call for a "normal
marital relationship11 as the Agreement's consideration.
Prenuptial

Agreement's language specifies the consideration as

"each party's promise of marriage."
p. 1.

The

See Prenuptial Agreement,

On March 1, 1986, the promises to marry were kept, the

parties were married, the marriage was consummated, and the consideration was exchanged.

Therefore, the consideration did not

fail.
The Trial Court based its conclusion regarding the
failed consideration on its, and plaintiff's, views as to what
constitutes a "normal marital relationship."

The Trial Court's

conclusion was improperly subjective instead of legal.
put, what constitutes a normal marital relationship?
defined?

tract.

How is it

And how does it compare to an abnormal marital rela-

tionship?
normal.

Simply

Every judge may have a different standard of what is
Such a standard destroys the parties' ability to con-

For these reasons, courts reject this subjective approach

as a basis to invalidate prenuptial agreements.

See Marriage of

Dawley, 551 P.2d at 329 ("[a] rule measuring the validity of all
prenuptial agreements by [the] subjective contemplation of the
-19-

parties hazards the validity of all prenuptial agreements").
Consequently, the Trial Court applied an inappropriate standard
to adjudicate the consideration of the Agreement.
As noted above, mutual waivers of property rights also
constitutes consideration.
such a waiver.

The Prenuptial Agreement contains

Therefore, the Prenuptial Agreement stands inde-

pendently on the basis of that consideration.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial
Court's conclusion as to failed consideration.

The Trial Court

misread and misinterpreted the Prenuptial Agreement's language as
to consideration.

The Prenuptial Agreement's language called for

the consideration of mutual promises to marry.
married and it was consummated.

The parties were

The consideration was not, as

the Trial Court concluded, a "normal marital relationship;" and,
a court should not rewrite a prenuptial agreement to conform to
its own moral and social subjective tests of normalcy.

A subjec-

tive standard such as "normal marital relationship" reeks havoc
on all prenuptial agreements, thus making them vulnerable to the
"wisdom" or personal views of the trial court.

Furthermore, the

Prenuptial Agreement's validity stands as an independent form of
consideration, the mutual waiver of property rights.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE PERIMETERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S EQUITABLE POWER WHEN A TRIAL COURT REVIEWS A
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT.
A*

Introduction
The Trial Court concluded that it had the equitable

power to restructure the Agreement's terms to make it fair or
-20-

more just.

In effect, the Trial Court held that even if other-

wise valid at law, it could rewrite or refuse to enforce a
prenuptial agreement as part of its equitable power.

(R. 396)

While the Trial Court reserved applying its conclusion to this
case, this conclusion must be addressed.
onstrate,

As defendant will dem-

the Trial Court misinterpreted its equitable and legal

powers; or alternatively, it should not have such equitable
powers.
B.

Applicable Legal Standard
1.

Any Cases Supporting The Trial Court's Theory Are
Based On Outmoded Thinking.

Some Utah cases lend credence to the Trial Court's
interpretation of its equitable powers.

See Penrose v. Penrose,

656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982) (upholding prenuptial agreement after
inquiring into its fairness); Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116,
363 P.2d 779 (1961) (holding trial court properly used "fairness
review" for coverture agreement).
While these cases buttress the Trial Court's conclusion, they must be viewed in context.

Only one case talks about

the "fairness review" in the context of a prenuptial agreement.
See Penrose, 656 at 1018.

Penrose does not define what criteria

the court must use when determining fairness.
The other cases deal with other contracts relating to
marriage and property division.

Mathie is not directly on point

as to a court's equitable powers in the prenuptial agreement's
context because no prenuptial agreement was at issue.

-21-

The Mathie

case specifically noted that the coverture agreement did not contemplate the future divorce; and, did not dispose of property in
the event of a divorce.

See Mathie, 363 P.2d at 783.

The Mathie

case suffers from outmoded thinking about marriage; the equality
of the parties to marriage; the parties' bargaining power; and,
the parties1 right to freely contract.
2.

The Appropriate Standard Of Review For Prenuptial
Agreements.

Reviewing prenuptial agreements for "fairness" allows
the Trial Court to apply a vague and subjective standard.

One

court accurately summarized the inherent problems of the "fairness review" standard in the prenuptial agreement context:
The term "fairf" without some further elaboration, gives no guideline whatsoever concerning which agreements will be
binding and which agreements will be struck
down. Furthermore, candor compels us to
raise to a conscience level the fact, as in
this case, prenuptial agreements will almost
always be entered into between people with
property or an income potential to protect on
one side and people who are impecunions on
the other. Measuring an agreement by an
undefined judicial standard of fairness is an
invitation to the very wealth distribution
that these agreements are designed to
prevent.
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W. Va. 1985).

The fairness

review standard justifies itself by arguing that the parties
often have unequal bargaining power.

This problem, however,

always arises to some extent with any contractual relationship.
And if this standard applied across the board, all contracts
between rich and poor, smart and not-so-smart could be
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invalidated by a court.

See Gant v. Ganty 329 S.E.2d at 114

(stating these principals).

It must be remembered that these

parties were college graduates.

Plaintiff was educated at law

and wrote and entered contracts during his lengthy business
carreer.

The parties knew and understood the binding effect of

contracts.
This "fairness" standard of review does not exist anywhere else in contract law.

In the ordinary contract case, Utah

courts are prohibited from such intervention.

Utah law specifi-

cally prohibits a court from using its equitable powers in the
fashion espoused by the Trial Court.

Simply put, a Utah trial

court cannot rewrite a contract to make it "fair."

A trial

court's discretionary boundaries are narrowly drawn, and do not
entitle a court to restructure the contract according to that
court's desires.

See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549

(Utah 1982) (stating these principles and prohibitions).
The West Virginia Court also explained what courts mean
when they refer to the fairness review standard:
The cases that discuss prenuptial
agreements in other jurisdictions lead to the
conclusion that when courts talk about "fairness" in the setting of a prenuptial agreement, they are usually not talking about an
entirely subjective, open-ended concept that
allows judges to renegotiate contracts and
substitute their own judgment for the agreement of the parties. Rather, what other
courts are really concerned about is
"foreseeability."
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Gant v, Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114-15 (W. Va. 1985),

The West

Virginia court then explained the proper standard of review for
prenuptial agreements:
West Virginia courts will not evaluate the substance of fairness of prenuptial
agreements; most prenuptial agreements are
designed to preserve the property interest of
the stronger party. Nonetheless, prenuptial
agreements will be enforced in their explicit
terms only to the extent the circumstances at
the time the marriage ends are roughly what
the parties foresaw at the time they entered
into the prenuptial agreement.
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985).
Applying the West Virginia review standard mandates
upholding and enforcing the Prenuptial Agreement as written.
this case, nothing was unforeseen.

In

Divorce was not unforeseen.

On the contrary, the Prenuptial Agreement addresses that scenario.

And consequently, the Prenuptial Agreement passes the

West Virginia review standard.
Accordingly, this Court should adopt the West Virginia
review standard.

It promotes the validity of prenuptial agree-

ments; and, the parties' purposes for entering into such a contract.

It more accurately reflects the general contract law of

this state.

At the same time, the West Virginia standard pro-

tects the parties from unforeseen contingencies.

It most deli-

cately balances social concerns with the parties' contractual
intentions.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION WAS A BINDING ORDER.
A.

Introduction
On August 17, 1986, defendant petitioned the Court,

through the procedure of the Domestic Relations Commissioner (the
"Commissioner"), for temporary support and other matters.

On

September 2, 1985, the Commissioner heard defendant's Motion and
issued a recommendation.
Motion.

The Recommendation denied defendant's

The Commissioner also recommended that defendant not

sale any of the stock in her possession.
On September 5, 1986, defendant objected to the
Commissioner's Recommendation.

Prior to the time the Trial Court

heard defendant's objection, but after the Recommendation and
after defendant had formally objected, defendant sold 372 shares
of her 1,292 shares of Texas Eastern Stock.

On January 7, 1987,

plaintiff moved the Trial Court for an Order to Show Cause to
hold defendant in contempt for her sale of the Texas Eastern
shares.
On January 23, 1987, the Trial Court heard defendant's
objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation.
plaintiff's Motion to hold defendant in contempt.

It also heard
The Trial

Court denied defendant's objections and upheld the Commissioner's
Recommendation.

6

The Trial Court also held that defendant was in

Shortly after the wedding, defendant had received 1272
shares of Texas Eastern Corporation Stock pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the Prenuptial Agreement.
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contempt on the grounds that she had violated an Order of the
Court when she sold the shares of stock; and, that the
Commissioner's Recommendation was as binding upon her as if it
were an Order of the Court.

The Trial Court ordered defendant to

return the unsold shares to her attorney.

It also threatened to

default her answer in the event she was found in contempt again.
As defendant will demonstrate, the Trial Court erred.
B.

Applicable Legal Standard
Utah law establishes the Commissioner's jurisdiction,

duties and authority.
(1985).

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-4.2, 4.3 & 4.4

The Commissioner's jurisdiction is limited to making

recommendations.

See Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-4.4(a) & (b) (1985)

(defining the role of the Commissioner as making recommendations
to the trial court).

If a party objects to the recommendation,

the objection goes to the Trial Court for further action.

See

Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-4.4(c) (1985) (stating that the
Commissioner's recommendation becomes an Order of the Court if
not objected to within ten (10) days).
Utah law only authorizes the Commissioner to make a
recommendation.

A recommendation becomes an Order only if both

parties acquiesce to it and it is signed by the trial judge.
the event an objection is filed, the recommendation does not
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In

become an order.

Instead, the Trial Court must determine the
issues and make an appropriate Order. 7
The Commissioner customarily hears the parties1 Motions

on arguments or proffers by counsel.

The Commissioner does not

hear testimony or afford the parties an opportunity for cross
examination.

The Commissioner followed that procedure in this

case.
If the Commissioner's Recommendation is considered an
Order as binding upon the party after the party properly objects
but prior to the Trial Court's adjudication of the issues, then
the court has adjudicated a party's personal and property rights.
And it has done so before the party has had an opportunity to a
Q

full evidentiary hearing.

7

This scenario has been criticized by

The Second Judicial District enacted a local rule that the
Domestic Relations Commissioner's recommendation "shall
stand pending entry of an Order of the Court encompassing
the recommendations pending final outcome of further hearing
before a district judge in the event objections are filed."
See Second District Local Rule 13.
The Fourth Judicial District issued an Order that the
Commissioner's recommendation shall "stand pending the final
outcome of further hearings before the district judge."
This Order includes situations where a party files a timely
objection. See Fourth District Local Rule 24.
The Third Judicial District, where this case was tried, does
not have a local rule similar to the rules of Second and
Fourth District. As defendant will demonstrate, the Second
and Fourth District's rules and trial court decision in this
case violate fundamental constitutional principles.

8

If the Trial Court followed the State statute's mandate,
this problem would not arise. Under the statute, the CornFootnote continued on next page.
-27-

this Court in the past.

See Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 69 Utah Adv.

Rptr. 38 (Nov. 3, 1987) (noting that this procedure deprives a
party of his due process rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
issues involved).
In this case, defendant properly and timely objected to
the Commissioner's Recommendation.

After that objection, defeng
dant sold the stock contrary to the Recommendation.
However,
the stock was sold prior to the Trial Court's determination of
defendant's objections.

The Trial Court based its decision on

the grounds that the Commissioner's Recommendation was a binding
Order.

In effect, the Trial Court deprived defendant of her

right to a full hearing on the issues of temporary support and
other related matters before the Order became effective.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial
Court's Order that defendant was in contempt.

This Court should

Footnote continued from previous page.
missioner functions as a filter because some parties will
not object after the ten day period. This filter benefits
the judicial system by saving time and resources. However,
if a party objects to the recommendation, he or she may have
a hearing at the trial court level and satisfy the parties'
due process rights. The statute promotes both the interest
of economy and efficiency and the interest of due process.
9

Defendant has made a full accounting to the court of the
proceeds received from the sale. These proceeds were generally spent for her housing and personal expenses after the
parties separated. (R. 210-215)
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hold that the Commissioner's recommendation does not have the
effect of an Order when objections are timely filed.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY HER OWN
ATTORNEY'S FEES OUT OF THE PROPERTY AWARDED TO HER UPON
DIVORCE.
A.

Introduction
The Trial Court ordered defendant to pay her attorneys

$20,000.00 out of the property she received upon divorce.
398)

(R.

As defendant will demonstrate, the Trial Court abused its

discretion.
B.

Application Legal Standard
In a divorce action, the Trial Court has broad discre-

tion in awarding attorneys' fees and determining their amount.
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) (stating these
principles).
However, a trial court abuses its discretion when it:
(1) orders a party to pay his or her own attorneys' fees out of
property awarded to him or her upon divorce; see, e.g., Ierrulli
and Ierrulli, 121 Or. App. 515, 535 P.2d 575 (1975) (Appeals
Court refused to make the wife pay her own attorneys' fees out of
assets she received upon divorce); and, (2) orders a party to pay
his or her own attorney a specific sum of money, see Smith v.
Smith, 673 P.2d 850 (Okl. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the trial
court's order specifying the fee each party was to pay his or her
own lawyer was an abuse of discretion).
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C.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion
The applicable legal standard establishes the Trial

Court abused its discretion as to its attorney's fees Order.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's Order,
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding and
conclusion that the Prenuptial Agreement violates public policy.
It should establish guidelines for determining when prenuptial
agreements violate, or do not violate, public policy.

It should

remand to the Trial Court for factual findinas consistent with
its opinion.
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding
that the Prenuptial Agreement's consideration called for "a normal marital relationship," and, that the Agreement's consideration failed.

It should remand to the Trial Court to make factual

findings consistent with its interpretation of the Agreement's
language.
This Court should hold that the Trial Court may not
subjectively inquire into the fairness of a prenuptial agreement.
Instead, this Court should establish a "foreseeability under the
circumstances" standard of review; and, remand to the Trial Court
for findings consistent with its opinion.
This Court should hold that the Commissioner of Domestic Relations' Report and Recommendation is not binding on a
party until the opposing party's objections are properly heard.
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This Court should reverse the Trial Court's holding; and, remand
for factual findings consistent with its opinion.
This Court should hold that a trial court may not force
a party to pay its own attorneys' fees and to specify the amount.
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's holding; and, remand
for findings consistent with its opinion.
DATED this £ -

day of June, 1988.
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PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 25th day of
February, 1986, by and between ALFRED J. NEILSON (hereinafter
referred to as "ALFRED11), a resident of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and CARLEEN COLLRAM M0FF1TT (hereinafter referred to
as "CARLEEN11), a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement are contemplating marriage in the immediate future; and
WHEREAS, each of the parties to this Agreement owns
and possesses certain properties, as reflected by their books,
accountings and documents; and
WHEREAS, ALFRED has fully disclosed to CARLEEN the
nature and extent of his various property interests and the
sources of his income; and
WHEREAS, CARLEEN has fully disclosed to ALFRED the
nature and extent of her various property interests and the
sources of her income; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to enter into this marriage
settlement agreement to affirm and evidence their understandings
relating to their separate properties, various property rights
and other related matters, such understandings to be effective
and binding on a permanent basis.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of each party's
promise of marriage to the other party and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, IT IS AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD AS FOLLOWS,
to-wit:
1. Except as set forth in this Agreement, CARLEEN
agrees that all property and property rights, real, personal
and mixed, of every type and description, now owned or
possessed, or which at the time of the marriage are owned or
possessed by ALFRED, or which shall be acquired hereafter by
ALFRED by inheritance or otherwise, shall be and continue to
be, during and after the marriage, the sole and separate
property of ALFRED, and CARLEEN shall have no rights or
interests therein.

ADDENDUM "A"

000012

Except as set forth in this Agreement, ALFRED agrees
that all property and property rights, real, personal and
mixed, of every type and description, now owned or possessed,
or which at the time of the marriage are owned or possessed by
CARLEEN, or which shall be acquired hereafter by CARLEEN by
inheritance or otherwise, shall be and continue to be, during
and after the marriage, the sole and separate property of
CARLEEN, and ALFRED shall have no rights or interests therein.
2. Each party hereto agrees and promises that any and
all earnings, income, dividends, accretions, rents, issues, and
profits arising or emanating from, or earned by or received in
respect to, the separate property of either party hereto, shall
be and continue to be throughout the marriage the joint marital
property of the parties*
3. Each party hereto agrees and promises that any and
all salaries, bonuses or other compensatory arrangements for
personal services, which are earned or received by either party
during the marriage, whether retirement income or otherwise,
shall be and continue to be throughout the marriage the joint
marital property of the parties.
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, during
the continuance of the marriage relations herein contemplated,
each of the parties hereto is to have the full, complete and
exclusive right to own, control and dispose of his or her
separate property, the same as if the marriage relation did not
exist, and each of said parties is to have the full and exclusive right to dispose of and sell any and all real, personal or
mixed property now or hereafter owned by each of said parties,
respectively, without the other joining, and said transfer by
either of the parties hereto shall convey the same title that
such transfer would have conveyed had the marriage relation not
existed.
5. Each year during the continuance of marriage
relations herein contemplated, the parties hereto agree to file
joint Federal and State Income Tax Returns unless they mutually
agree to file separate returns for such year.
6. Each party hereto agrees that this Agreement is
intended to limit the right of either party to participate in
the estate of the other, whether their marriage relation is
terminated by death or otherwise.
7. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a
waiver or renunciation by CARLEEN of any gift, bequest or
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devise which may be voluntarily made to her by ALFRED, but this
provision shall not be construed as a promise or representation
that any such gift, bequest or devise will be made by ALFRED.
Further, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a
waiver or renunciation by ALFRED, of any gift, bequest or
devise which may be voluntarily made to him by CARLEEN, but
this provision shall not be construed as a promise or representation that any such gift, bequest or devise will be made by
CARLEEN.
8. Each of the parties are executing new Wills, under
the terms of which they will each leave all of his or her
estate to his or her surviving spouse if said surviving spouse
survives him or her. Each of the parties hereto agree that
they will not change the depositive provisions of their
respective Wills during the lifetime of the other party,
provided however, that if either party commences a divorce
action, the other party shall then be relieved of the
obligation under this paragraph and may then change his or her
Will.
9. At the time of executing this Agreement, ALFRED
owns 25,440 shares of Texas Eastern Corporation stock. It will
be necessary to sell certain shares of said stock to pay the
taxes arising as a result of prior stock sales, and it may be
necessary in the future to sell additional shares of said
stock. Nevertheless, ALFRED agrees to transfer to CARLEEN five
percent (5%) of said stock (or any asset into which it may be
converted) in each year for a period of nine (9) years with the
intention that at the end of nine (9) years, each of them will
own an equal number of shares of said stock. On the date of
marriage, ALFRED shall transfer to CARLEEN five percent (5%) of
said stock. On each anniversary of their marriage thereafter,
ALFRED will transfer the fraction of the shares then owned by
him as indicated on the following chart:
Fraction of Texas Eastern
Shares Then Owned by Alfred
to be Transferred to Carleen

Anniversary Date of Marriage

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1/19th
l/18th
l/17th
l/16th
l/15th
l/14th
l/13th
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8
9

l/12th
1/llth or such
lesser amount as necessary
to give CARLEEN the same
number of shares as ALFRED,

xn tne event tne. parties are subsequently divorced in
a divorce-action initiated by CARLEEN, it is understood and
agreed that the only assets she shall be entitled to receive
from the separate property owned by ALFRED are the shares of
Texas Eastern Corporation stock which has theretofore been
transferred to her* On the other hand, if the parties are
divorced in an action initiated by ALFRED, CARLEEN shall be
entitled to receive, as the only property to be transferred by
the divorce to her from the separate property of ALFRED,
sufficient shares of Texas Eastern Corporation stock so that
she will own at the time of the divorce the same number of
shares of said stock as will then be owned by ALFRED,
10. In order to carry out the provisions of paragraphs
8 and 9 above, the parties agree that, except for the sale of
Texas Eastern Corporation stock necessary to pay income taxes
on prior sales, there shall be no sale or exchange of shares of
said stock by either party except upon the mutual agreement of
both of the parties hereto. In the event shares of stock are
sold or exchanged and the proceeds are reinvested, said
proceeds shall be retained and separately identified and shall
be subject to the same provisions of this and the next two
preceding paragraphs and any new investments shall likewise not
be sold without the consent of both parties,
11. This Agreement is intended to be binding upon the
parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.
12. The parties hereto agree to sign any and all deeds,
contracts and agreements necessary to carry out the terms of
this agreement.
13. The parties agree that this Agreement shall be
subject to cancellation, termination, supplementation, amendment or modification only by the execution of a writing signed
by both parties and acknowledged in the same manner as this
Agreement. Should either party elect to make a gift, by inter
vivos gift or by Will, of his or her separate property (or any
rights therein or thereto) to the other party, such gift shall
in no way affect or change this Agreement, except and solely to
the extent of the specific property so given.
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14. This Agreement shall become effective only on
consummation of the proposed marriage between the parties
hereto, and if such marriage does not take place then this
Agreement shall be null and void.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto
executed'this Aateemeiit as of the date and -year first abov^
written.

Alfred

a./SAetLson

^ v /

Carleen Collram Mo

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

On this 25th day of February, 1986, personally appeared
before me, ALFRED J« NEILSON, one of the signers of the above
and foregoing Agreement, who acknowledged that he executed the
same.

£h

'cU

j*~~t^^^

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
April 16, 1989

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss,

On this 25th day of February, 1986, personally appeared
before me, CARLEEN COLLRAM MOFFITT, one of the signers of the
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above and foregoing Agreement, who "acknowledged that she
executed the same.
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
April 16, 1989
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ADDENDUM "B"
The cases recognizing the validity of prenuptial
agreements include:
Dinqledine v. Dinqledine, 258 Arc. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189
(1975);
In Re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 131 Cal.
Reptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323 (1976);
Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982);
Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 349 A.2d
712 (1976);
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. S.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev.'d,
257 S.2d 530 (Fla. 1972);
Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662, 664
(1982);
Rossiter v. Rossiter, 4 Ha. App. 333, 666 P.2d 617
(1983);
Volid v. Volid, 6 111. App. 3d, 386, 286 N.E.2d 42
(1972);
Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978);
Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810
(1981);
Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984);
Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 365 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985);
Perry v. Perry. 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Supp. 361, 491 A.2d
752 (1985);
Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Supp. 16, 477 A.2d 833
(1984);
Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St.2d 234, 431 N.E.2d 667 (1982);
Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1977);
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973)
Gant, 239 S.E.2d at 114-16;
In Re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wa.2d 6 49, 565 P.2d
(1977);
Button v. Button, 126 Wis.2d 521, 378 N.W.2d 294 (1985)
mlm:053188a

